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USURY LAWS: UNDERDEVELOPED
PROTECTION IN AN OVERDEVELOPED
MARKET
The charge card, the revolving account, numerous time pay-
ment plans, and the "finance industry" have created a market
place without cash. From the consumer's viewpoint, the ease
with which goods may be obtained often outweighs the confu-
sion resulting from the computation of time charges and the
question of where to finance.1 With his judgment thus marred,
the consumer, unless he is adequately protected by the law, is
vulnerable to the unscrupulous money lender or seller of goods.
The usury statutes, generally, protect the borrower from the
payment of more than a specified rate of interest. These statutes,
however, do not affect the entire consumer market because, in
a credit sale, "a purchaser is not like the needy borrower, a
victim of a rapacious lender, since he can refrain from the pur-
chase if he does not choose to pay the price asked by the seller."2
In the nineteenth century, the sale on credit was instituted
and almost immediately, the courts were asked to determine the
extent to which the additional charges were to be considered
interest.
As a result, the time-price doctrine emerged; the courts
held that one can offer his goods for sale at two prices
-a credit, or time, price and a cash price. The differ-
ence between the two-the time-price differential-can
exceed the amount allowable under the usury laws be-
cause it is not interest. 8
Laws have been designed to allow protection for the consumer
as he attempts to seek out the most advantageous financing
arrangement.4 These laws have been based on the premise that
the consumer should know what financing will cost. Closely
related to these efforts has been a more fundamental and more
1. Consumer in this context refers to both the buyer and the debtor-two
terms which many writers and courts would prefer to distinguish.
2. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Hanner, 268 N.C. 668, 672, 151 S.E.2d 579, 582
(1966). See also Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E2d
692 (1963).
3. Jordon & Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64
MicH. L REv. 1285 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Jordon].
4. Jordon, supra note 3.
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controversial issue: Legislative involvement in the regulation of
maximum credit charges in all credit transactions.
With the advent of legislation in the area of credit sales,
installment and consumer loans, however, the future of the usury
laws is conjectural.5 To evaluate South Carolina legislation,
several questions must be posed and answers sought: Are South
Carolina's usury laws typical? How are our usury laws applied
to consumer or debtor protection? What is the future of con-
sumer protection in South Carolina?
I. Aim SOUTH CARoIaNA's UsUny LAWS TrpIcAL?
A. Criteria for lury.
To constitute usury, many statutes and courts require that
the interest charged must be attached to a "loan or forbearance"
of money.( South Carolina's basic usury statute, 7 however, does
not define usury in the classic terms of "a loan or forbearance,"
charged with an excessive rate of interest. The language of the
South Carolina statute is explicit in what it proscribes:
[N]o greater interest than six per cent per annum shall
be charged, taken, agreed upon or allowed upon any
contract . . . for the hiring, lending or use of money or
other commodity .... 8
The statute further provides that the upper limits shall be
seven per cent on written contracts.
This failure to include what is considered to be the standard
elements of usury-a loan or forbearance-does not, however,
appear to affect our judicial interpretation of usury. In Caro-
lina Savings Bank v. Parrott,9 the words of the usury laws were
viewed as mandatory. It was stated that, "[t]he usury law ...
is very positive and peremptory"10 , allowing no greater interest
than that which the law recognizes. Intent is now an issue.
After the facts are ascertained, whether a contract is
usurious is a question of law, and proof that the agree-
ment is corrupt is not necessary, for a contract may be
5. For the historical background and the general scope of decisions con-
cerning the applicability of usury laws to credit sales, see Note, Applicability
of Usury Laws to Credit Installment Sales, 4 S.C.L.Q. 290 (1951).
6. Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967). This annotation represents a compara-
tive study of credit sales and cash sales and the effect of the usury laws.
7. S.C. CoDE Aixx. § 8-3 (1962).
8. Id.
9. 30 S.C. 61, 8 S.E. 199 (1888).
10. Id. at 67, 8 S.E_ at 201.
1969]
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usurious though the parties did not know that it was
contrary to law.1
The basic Georgia usury statute12 and its courts use the ele-
ments of a "loan or forbearance" to determine usury. In Bank
of Lumpkin v. Farmers' State Bank,8 the court stated that the
four requirements for every usurious transaction are:
(1) A loan or forbearance of money, either expressed
or implied; (2) upon an understanding that the prin-
cipal shall or may be returned; (3) and that for such
loan or forbearance a greater profit than is authorized
by law should be paid or is agreed to be paid; (4) that
the contract was made with intent to violate the law.14
The court, however, expanded the last element by stating that
a corrupt intent will be implied if the other requirements are
expressed on the face of the contract.15 In essence, the Georgia
court agreed with the South Carolina court that one does not
necessarily need to know that he is violating the statute to be
charged with usury.
In Plyler v. McGee,'0 a South Carolina case, the lender hon-
estly believed that he could collect compound interest under the
terms of the note. The court, however, said that since he had
the intent and meant to collect the compound interest, which
was above the legal rate, the transaction was usurious. Despite
this holding, the court, in qualifying its stand against usury,
recognized that there are mistakes which may be made that will
rebut the implication of usury. In explaining its position, the
court pointed out that if the lender had collected the amount
unintentionally by way of miscalculation of interest, the transac-
tion would not have been usurious.1
7
11. Id. at 68, 8 S.E. at 202. See also Merchant's & Planters' Bank v. Sarratt,
77 S.C. 141, 57 S.E. 621 (1907) ; Thompson v. Nesbit, 2 Rich. 73 (S.C. 1845).
12. GA. CODE ANN. § 57-101 (1937). The statute provides that "in no event
shall any person, company, or corporation reserve, charge, or take for any loan
or advance of money, or forbearance to enforce the collection of any sum of
money, any rate of interest greater than eight per centum per annum, either
directly or indirectly ... .
13. 161 Ga. 801, 132 S.E. 221 (1926).
14. Id. at 811, 132 S.E. at 225; accord, Harrison v. Arrendale, 113 Ga. App.
118, 147 S.E.2d 356 (1966).
15. 161 Ga. at 811, 132 S.E. at 225. For application, see Plastic Dev. Corp.
v. Flexible Prod. Co., 112 Ga. App. 460, 145 S.E2d 655 (1965).
16. 76 S.C. 450, 57 S.E. 180 (1907).
17. Accord, Graydon v. Standard Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 145 S.C. 551, 143
S.E. 259 (1928), in which the court stated that to find usury "would be tend-
ing to make of the usury statute a sword instead of a shield .... ." Id. at
557, 143 S.E. at 261.
[Vol. 21
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North Carolina has also designed its statute so that the court
may use the standard criteria-a loan or forbearance-for find-
ing usury. The statute provides that the legal rate shall be six
per cent per annum and "no more."'' 8 In applying the statute,
the court in Michigan NationaZ Bank 'v. Hanner 9 accepted the
four elements which the Georgia court used to determine usury
-(1) a loan or forbearance, expressed or implied; (2) an agree-
ment to repay; (3) a charge of a greater rate of interest than
allowed by law; and (4) a corrupt intent or scheme to take more
than the legal rate. It is doubtful, however, that the North Caro-
lina courts will declare a transaction usurious where it cannot
be shown that a corrupt intent or scheme existed, even if the
other elements are present. Section 21-220 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina specifically provides that before the
penalty for usury will attach, the lender must "knowingly" take,
receive, reserve or charge a greater rate of interest than is
allowed by law. This principle was applied in Preyer v. Par-
kern' in which the court pointed out that "unless these four
things concur in any transaction it is safe to say that no case of
usury can be declared.
2 2
Usury is predicated on the fact that "interest" in excess of the
maximum allowed by law is charged on a transaction which
involves a, loan or forbearance or use of money. When it is clear
that the charge was actually interest, then the court as a matter
of law will determine whether the charge was in excess of the
legal limit.23 The problem arises, however, when the court can-
not, as a matter of law, find the existence of a transaction which
normally can be identified as a loan, or forbearance, or use of
money. In this situation, it becomes a question for the jury as
to whether the additional charge was interest.
The jury may be affected by the fact that the debtor entered
the transaction understanding what he was to pay. If the jury
determines that the transaction is non-usurious, though some of
the elements of usury are present, the court will be reluctant to
overrule the jury and imply a usurious transaction.
18. GEN. STAT. OF N.C. § 24-1 (Replacement 1965).
19. 268 N.C. 668, 151 S.E.2d 579 (1966). See also Carolina Indus. Bank v.
Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963) ; Preyer v. Parker, 257 N.C.
440, 125 S.E2d 916 (1962); Savings Loan & Trust Co. v. Yokley, 174 N.C.
573, 94 S.E. 102 (1917).
20. GEN. STAT. OF N.C. § 24-2 (Replacement 1965).
21. 257 N.C. 440, 125 S.E.2d 916 (1962).
22. Id. at 444, 125 S.E.2d at 919.
23. See Preyer v. Parker, 257 N.C. 440, 125 S.E2d 916 (1962).
1969] NOT .S
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B. Civil Remedies
The remedial section of our usury statute24 provides two
forms of relief: (1) the statute grants the debtor relief by void-
ing any remaining interest and costs, but does not void the debt
as to principal, and, (9) the statute provides a penalty where
the debtor has paid part or all of the interest charges; the
debtor may recover double the amount of interest actually
paid.
25
During the nineteenth century North Carolina's usury laws
provided a severe penalty for extending usurious credit, voiding
the contract both as to principal and interest. A conflict devel-
oped, however, concerning the application of the usury law to
the national banks and the North Carolina legislature revamped
its laws, in effect, bringing them in line with those of South
Carolina.26 At present, the North Carolina statute27 provides
for voiding a usurious contract of interest only and allows
double recovery of interest actually paid.
28
It has been suggested that these forfeiture provisions will
"tend to decrease the likelihood of strict application of the
statute by the courts, due to the judicial abhorrence of forfeit-
ure.129 Furthermore, it is argued that the severity of these pro-
visions should be kept to a minimum, by confining the penalty
to interest alone, and not "multiple" interest. Similar remedies
in Georgia 0 and Tennessee 31 are limited to single recovery of
interest actually paid; but, it does not appear that there is any
significant difference between the application of the usury laws
of Georgia and Tennessee and those of North Carolina and
South Carolina.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-5 (1962).
25. For application of § 8-5 to permit double recovery, see Atlantic Discount
Corp. v. Driskell, 239 S.C. 500, 123 S.E2d 832 (1962), in which it was held
that discounting the interest in advance did not constitute an actual receipt of
payment by the creditor. The creditor actually received only a proportional
amount of interest on each payment.
26. For a history of North Carolina usury laws, see Commercial Credit
Corp. v. Robeson Motors, 243 N.C. 326, 90 S.E.2d 886 (1956).
27. GEN. STAT. OF N.C. § 24-2 (Replacement 1965).
28. For application of § 24-2, see Wilkins v. Commercial Fin. Co., 237 N.C.
396, 75 S.E.2d 118 (1953).
29. Note, supra note 6, at 308.
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 57-112 (1935), provides that there shall be a forfeiture
of "the entire interest so charged or taken . . . ." Construed in Service Loan
& Fin. Corp. v. McDaniel, 115 Ga. App. 548, 154 S.E.2d 823 (1967).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-117 (Replacement 1964), provides that if
usury is paid, the borrower may recover the amount by a court action. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-14-112 (Replacement 1964), further provides that the defend-
ant "may avoid the excess over legal interest . ..
5
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II. Usuny LAws AND CoNsumiR PRTEOTio
A. Limitation of Usury Statute to Loan Transactions
Although the consumer is protected when procuring a loan,
the basic South Carolina usury statute which was designed to
provide this protection has been, to some extent, superseded.
Special legislation has been enacted specifically covering con-
sumer loans made by banks, building and loan associations and
other licensed lending institutions. In some circumstances these
special acts do not materially change the amount which the
lender may receive. In section 8-233,32 dealing with installment
loans, the South Carolina legislature set the maximum rate for
interest or add-on charges at seven per cent per annum for the
making of "loans and advances of credit to persons . . . pay-
able in installments, for the financing of purchases and for
other desirable purposes .... ,,33
In drafting the Consumer Finance Law,3 4 however, the legis-
lature increased the maximum amount that may be charged by
licensees who lend sums of money not exceeding seven thousand
five hundred dollars ($7500). For cash advances not exceeding
one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) the licensee may charge a
maximum of two dollars and fifty cents ($2.50) per month. As
to loans exceeding one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00), the
lender may charge twenty dollars ($20.00) for the first one
hundred dollars ($100.00), eighteen dollars ($18.00) per hun-
dred for the next two hundred dollars ($200.00), and nine dol-
lars ($9.00) per hundred for those amounts exceeding three
hundred dollars ($300.00) but not exceeding one thousand dol-
lars ($1000.00).3 5 Georgia,3 6 North Carolina 7 and Tennessee3 8
have passed similar laws which have the same general effect.
32. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 8-233 (Supp. 1968).
33. Id.
34. S.C. CODE AN. § 8-800.10 (Supp. 1967).
35. Id.
36. See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 25-315 (Supp. 1967). It provides for
loans by licensees not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00)
for a period of two years or less. The licensee may "charge, contract for,
receive and collect interest at a rate not to exceed eight per cent (8%) per
annum." He may also charge a fee in addition which may not exceed eight per
cent (8%) of the first six hundred dollars ($600.00), and four per cent (4%)
for the excess.
37. See generally GN. STAT. OF N.C. § 53-166 (Replacement 1965). It pro-
vides for loans not exceeding six hundred dollars ($600.00).
38. See generally TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-437 (Replacement Supp. 1968)
(installment loans by banks and trust companies). See also TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 45-2007 (Replacement 1964) (industrial loans and thrift corporations).
1969]
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Lack of effectiveness of the old usury laws in certain applica-
tions is not an indication that these new statutes are destructive.
The customer has not lost what protection he had. Usury laws
still protect against the unlicensed lenders, but the protection
has shifted. It is hoped that the new legislation will enable the
consumer to understand the discrepancy in charges of various
institutions, thus allowing the "selling industry" and the
"finance industry" to compete somewhat more effectively for
the consumer's patronage. Under the old law, the lender was
limited to a charge of seven per cent, but the seller could add
practically any charge for a credit sale, because the courts, for
all practical purposes, refused to apply the usury laws to credit
sales.
B. Usury and the Credit Sale
Courts have felt that the definition of usury and its elements
do not include the elements of a credit sale. The courts have
referred to a credit sale or "sale on time" as a sale with two
distinct prices-a cash price and a credit or time price. A credit
sale transaction is generally composed of the original cash price,
plus finance charges, service charges or "time-price differen-
tial," which the buyer will pay in installments.3 9 This total is
what the courts have referred to as the "credit-price." Suppose,
for example, A is offering a television for sale at a cash price
of two hundred dollars ($200.00). B wants to buy the set but
does not have cash readily available. A, therefore, offers to
allow B to pay for the television at ten dollars ($10.00) a week
for twenty-two weeks, or a total of two hundred and twenty
dollars ($220.00) for the "credit-price." The twenty dollars dif-
ference between the two prices is the "time-price differential."
The South Carolina Supreme Court has stated that
[it is manifest that any person owning property may
sell it at such price and on such terms as to time and
mode of payment as he may see fit, and such sale, if
bona fide, cannot be usurious however unconscienable
it may be.
40
In Osborne v. Fuller41 the court stated a principle from
which it appears that the court was prepared to pierce the veil
39. This is known as the "add-on" method of computing finance charges.
See supra note 5.
40. Brown v. Crandall, 218 S.C. 124, 127, 61 S.E.2d 761, 762 (1950). See
also Wheeler v. Marchbank, 32 S.C. 594, 10 S.E. 1011 (1889).
41. 92 S.C. 338, 75 S.E. 557 (1912).
[Vol.: 21
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of a true credit sale and declare such transactions usurious. It
said that "[t]he law will not permit evasions of the usury law
by excessive charge for the use of money under the disguise of
an increase price for credit in the sale of property."42 In this
case, however, there was no sale at all. Defendant Fuller had
purchased some goods for the plaintiff, Osborne, and Osborne
agreed to repay Fuller the amount paid for the goods plus
twenty per cent. In a suit to recover double the interest paid,
Fuller contended that the transaction was a sale on time, for
which he would legally charge a higher rate than allowed under
the usury laws. It is agreed that the court did pierce the veil
which Fuller set up, by pointing out that Fuller never owned the
goods; and, therefore, Osborne had received nothing but the
"use" of Fuller's money. The court, however, did not pierce the
veil of a true or actual sales transaction which it has contended
it will do when the credit price is, in fact, a cloak for usury.43
In Brown v. Crandal,4 the South Carolina court was faced
with a true credit sales transaction which consisted of a cash
price and a higher credit price-a time-price differential. In
Brown only one price was stated on the bill of sale. The court
determined, however, that the parties had agreed to additional
charges. These findings were sufficient to indicate an actual
credit price.
The South Carolina courts have frequently pointed out that
it is the substance of the transaction, not the form, to which the
courts will look to determine whether a transaction is in reality
a cloak for usury. In Brown, however, the court pointed to the
form which the seller used in Milford v. Milford," and stated
that if the seller had merely used different words, the transac-
tion would not have been usurious. In effect, this dictum opened
the door to the "usurious" credit sale; and at the same time,
locked out any glimmer of hope that the usury laws would be
applied to credit sales transactions, by telling sellers that the
language used is most important.4 6
North Carolina and Georgia are similar to the majority of
states in the application of their usury laws to the credit sales
42. Id. at 341, 75 S.E. at 558.
43. See Brown v. Crandall, 218 S.C. 124, 61 S.E2d 761 (1950); Martin v.
Pacific Mills, 160 S.C. 458, 158 S.E. 831 (1931).
44. 218 S.C. 124, 61 S.E2d 761 (1950).
45. 67 S.C. 553, 46 S.E. 479 (1903).
46. For application of Brown, see Note, supra note 6.
1969]
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transactions. The North Carolina court, in Mickhgan National
Bank v. Hawnr,47 after pointing out that it would pierce the
veil of a transaction when it is a subterfuge for usury, stated
that, in general, the price of a sale "is a matter of concern to
the parties and not to the courts . ". ..4 In Carolina Indus-
trial Bank V. Menrmon,49 it was further pointed out that "[a]
bona fide credit sale upon an installment payment basis does not
involve a loan of money or a forbearance of a debt within the
meaning and application of the usury laws,"150 nor is such
transaction converted into a loan because a finance company
furnishes rate schedules to the dealer, from which the dealer
computes the finance charges.
While accepting the general propositions as stated by most
courts as to the two price sale, the Georgia courts have set up
a further standard by which the court may find a usurious
transaction. In Plastics DeveZopnwnt Corp. v. Flexible Producs
Co.,51 the sales contract allowed the buyer a one per cent dis-
count if he paid within ten days from the date of shipment.
The contract, however, went on to provide that if the amount
were not paid in thirty days, a time-price differential would be
charged at the rate of one and one-half per cent per month on
the unpaid balance. The Georgia court held that the contract
was usurious when the property was to be sold at a cash valua-
tion and certain payments were to be deferred in consideration
of payment of interest at a rate above the legal limit.
The Tennessee legislature has removed most doubts as to
whether a "retail" credit sale can be affected by its usury laws.
In its Retail Installment Sales Act 52 the legislature stated that
no "retail installment transaction as defined . or any other
conditional sales contract . ..shall be . . .deemed to be loans
or forbearances of money or things of value ... ."53 Although
the purpose of the act may be to protect the consumer and regu-
late the time price of a sale, the buyer is still left in a precarious
position because of the notice provision of the statute. Section
47-11-10754 provides that the buyer must notify the seller of any
47. 268 N.C. 668, 151 S.E2d 579 (1966).
48. Id. at 672, 151 S.E.2d at 581.
49. 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E2d 692 (1963).
50. Id. at 339, 132 S.E.2d at 694.
51. 112 Ga. App. 460, 145 S.E.2d 655 (1965).
52. TE n. CODE ATN. § 47-11-101 (Replacement 1964).
53. Id. See also Falcone v. Palmer Ford Inc., 242 Md. 487, 219 A.2d 808
(1966).
54. TENr. CODE A=r. § 47-11-107 (Replacement 1964).
9
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overcharge under the statute, and gives the seller thirty days
to correct his wrong.55 In SoutMand Tractor, Iw. v. H &
N Construction 00.58 the Tennessee court pointed out that
"[u]nder this provision, the seller will be able to continue any
oppressive business practice against the installment buyer with
the assurance of no criminal or civil sanctions . . .157 because
once the seller rectifies the overcharge, he will be protected
against any liability for even an intentional violation of the act.
C. Arkansas-A New Twist
Arkansas has taken a hard line approach toward eradication
of usurious transactions. The Arkansas constitution provides
that all contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten per cent
per annum shall be void as to principal and interest.58 The
constitution also directs the state legislature to prohibit such
contracts by statute. Based on this constitutional mandate,
the legislature passed significant legislation which the courts,
many years later, were able to use to strike down the guise of
the "credit sale." Arkansas statute § 68-60259 permits agreement
for interest on any contract which is "due" or is "to become due"
and which does not exceed the legal rate. Arkansas statutes
§§ 68-608, and 60960 reaffirm the constitutional provision that
a usurious contract and its security will be void, and further
provides that the law will be the same even where the interest is
"indirect."
For many years the Arkansas courts recognized the artificial
distinction of two sales prices. However, in 1952 the court in
Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp.61 realized that "[b]uy-
ing at a credit price, as distinguished from a cash price, has
largely disappeared in fact .... -62 The court went on to say
that the credit price "is being used as a cloak for usury in many
cases by such words as time price differential, or some other such
language." 63 In Hare, the plaintiff purchased a used truck from
55. TENN. CoDE. ANN. § 47-110-103 (Replacement 1964), contains provisions
for disclosure requirements and sets a maximum charge on a given retail sales
transaction.
56. 52 Tenn. App. 664, 377 S.W.2d 789 (1963).
57. Id., 377 S.W.2d at 798, quoting Bankester, Personal Property Sales-
1959 Tenn. Survey, 12 VAmN. L. Rnv. 1270, 1280 (1959).
58. Aam CoNST. art 19, § 13.
59. APm. STAT. ANN. § 68-602 (1957).
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 68-603, 608-09 (1957).
61. 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
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one Meeks for one thousand seven hundred fifty dollars
($1750.00) reducing this figure by one hundred dollars
($100.00) cash payment and a five hundred dollar ($500.00)
trade-in, thus leaving a balance of one thousand one hundred
fifty dollars ($1150.00). To cover the balance the plaintiff
signed a note, on forms supplied Meeks by defendant, for one
thousand four hundred thirty-nine dollars and thirteen cents
($1,439.13), an increase of two hundred eighty-nine dollars and
thirteen cents ($289.13) to cover insurance, interest and service
charges on delayed payments. Shortly thereafter, Meeks trans-
ferred the title retaining contract and note to the defendant,
without recourse, and received one thousand one hundred fifty
dollars ($1,150.00) in cash.
After making six payments, the plaintiff filed suit to void the
contract on grounds of usury. To the charge of usury the de-
fendant set up three defenses: (1) that they were bona fide
purchasers for value, without notice and therefore had the de-
fenses of a holder in due course; (2) that the sale was a credit
sale for two thousand thirty-nine dollars and thirteen cents
($2,039.13), or one thousand seven hundred fifty dollars
($1750.00) in cash; (3) and that the service charges were only
one hundred forty dollars and eighty-nine cents ($140.89), the
rest being insurance costs.
The court rejected the first defense by referring to the con-
stitution and stating that if the transaction were usurious, the
contract and note thereto were void. As to the contention that
the charge was a legal addition to a credit sale, the court pointed
out that there was no credit price stated-that the only price
stated was one thousand seven hundred fifty dollars ($1750.00)
and the service charges were added to a balance after the initial
payment, and not to the original cash price. In addition, the
majority found that the interest and service charges were two
hundred eighty-nine dollars and thirteen cents ($289.13) and
not one hundred forty dollars and eighty-nine cents ($140.89),
since, at the time of the contract, the insurance amount had not
been determined.
Although the court did find usury, it held for the defendant,
saying that it could not retroactively overrule its past holdings.
Instead the court laid down a caveat that in future cases, it
would scrutinize the bona fides of an increased credit price as
a factual issue and void the contract if the higher price did not
[Vol. 21
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represent protection for the increased risk involved in a credit
sale. The court said further, that a valid credit sales contract
would still be recognized when the seller actually intended to
sell on credit; but when it is made on a cash estimate, it may be,
in effect, an agreement for forbearance, and thus usurious.6 4
Although the term "cash estimate" is often used by the courts,
it remains unsatisfactorily defined.
It was also pointed out that when the seller transfers the
paper to an individual or company at a price that permits the
transferee to receive a return of more than "ten per cent (10%)"
on its investment, a question of fact arises as to whether the
seller increased his cash price with a reasonable assurance that
he could discount the paper. Likewise, when the finance com-
pany supplies the dealer with a set of forms in a schedule for
credit price increases, it will be an indication that the dealer had
this reasonable assurance of being able to discount the paper.
Once this reasonable assurance is established, the transaction
will be, in substance, a loan which may be attacked on the
grounds of usury.
From 1952 to 1957, the criteria for usury under the Hare
decision was a source of confusion. In 1957, the Arkansas court
clarified itself by striking down a credit charge in Sloan v.
Sears Roebuck & 00.65 Sloan had purchased from the defendant
a garden tractor and tires. The carrying charge in this credit
sale contract, when added to the total case price of the purchase
amounted to more than ten per cent per annum. The trial court
held that there was no usury, saying that the usury laws did not
apply to credit sales, but applied only to loans of money and to
amounts charged by a creditor for allowing additional time to
pay a debt after it has become due.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed, saying that the
statute66 clearly stated that the usury laws referred to debts
"due or to become due," and not solely to loans of money or to
debts after they become due. The majority felt that the statute
lent itself to the interpretation that forbearance, as it was used
in the Acts, "simply means that the person to whom the money
is owed waits for all or part of the money after the consumma-
64. Id., 249 S.W2d at 977. The Georgia Court in Plastics Dev. Corp. v.
Flexible Prod. Co., 122 Ga. App. 460, 145 S.E.2d 655 (1965), used the same
definition for finding usury, but it is doubtful that the Georgia court will go
as far as Arkansas as to what is a cash estimate.
65. 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1957).
66. Anx. STAT. AN. § 68-602 (1957).
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tion of the contract in which the money is involved. The seller
forgoes payment in cash and waits for all or part of his
money.167
The court then pointed out that the sale was made on a cash
estimate based on the following facts: "Tickets were made out
showing the cash price; the cash price was named in the con-
tract; and sales tax was paid only on the cash price.168 In effect
the seller was merely adding an extra charge for waiting for the
money.
While it is true that the Arkansas constitution and statute
allow a very strong stand against usurious transactions, some
of these same propositions could have easily been used by the
South Carolina courts. The language of the South Carolina
statute "use of money or other commodity" could have been
employed by our court. Since the words "loan or forbearance"
are not used anywhere within this section, it may be argued that
the phrase "use of money or other commodities" implies a wait-
ing period before payment is received. The South Carolina court
did apply the phrase "use of money" in Osbone.69 Osborne,
however, did not involve a true sales transaction.
It might be suggested that a discussion of what the courts
might have done or what they will do is academic following the
B'own70 decision. Sellers and suppliers of services now use the
language suggested in Brown when formulating a credit con-
tract. It is unlikely, moreover, that B'ow r will be overruled,
even under the attack of the usury laws. The previous discus-
sion, however, has been aimed at pointing out the weaknesses in
our usury law. The usury law, a rule of thumb for the protection
of the debtor in its inception, has outlived its original utility.
The distinctions between the borrower and the buyer are obso-
lete. The "selling world" and the "lending world" have become
so interrelated that any future protection laws must encompass
both fields to be effective.
III. Wams Ami WE GonITG?
The consumer today meets a staggering problem when he
attempts to enter into a financing agreement for a contract of
67. 228 Ark. 464, 467, 308 S.W.2d 802, 804 (1957).
68. Id. at 471, 308 S.W.2d at 806.
69. Osborne v. Fuller, 92 S.C. 338, 75 S.E. 557 (1912); see text accompany-
ing note 41 supra.
70. Brown v. Crandall, 218 S.C. 124, 61 S.E2d 761 (1950); see text
accompanying note 44 supra.
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sale for consumer products. He must decide whether it would
be cheaper to finance the purchase through the seller, or to
borrow the money from a loan company or a bank and pay the
seller in cash. The average consumer cannot begin to compre-
hend the meaning or value of the rates quoted him by the indi-
vidual sellers and/or lending institutions. For example, the
seller may be offering the consumer the "privilege" of financing
the sale through him at a fixed dollar rate per hundred, per
year on a thirty-month contract. On the other hand the bank
is quoting the consumer a discount percentage rate per year
with a maturity period of twenty-four months. Simultaneously,
the small loan company is offering him a "deal" of a fixed dol-
lar rate for the first hundred dollars and a different rate for
each succeeding hundred dollars. It is doubtful that the con-
sumer knows "that on an installment contract, six dollars
($6.00) per hundred ($100.00) per year is not the same as six
per cent (6%) interest on the declining balance of the debt, but
is nearly twelve per cent (12%) interest on a twelve-month
contract.1
71
Today, the financial world is interrelated. Sellers and lending
institutions compete in the same market. The idea of debtor pro-
tection, which was bestowed by the usury laws is no longer
sufficient. Any new legislation must be designed to protect the
buyer as well as the borrower. To regulate one without the other
would be not only unfair to the financial institutions and retail
credit industries involved, but would also be unfair to the con-
suming public.
The concept of protection must, therefore, not be limited to
the setting of rates, but should also be designed so that the con-
sumer may use it as "self-protection." The regulation of rates
alone would not be sufficient because the consumer would still
be unable to evaluate the various methods of computation. The
answer is education of the public. The general public, however,
is unable to comprehend the complexities of the present rate
structure. Therefore, it is necessary to require that the consumer
be presented with rates and costs which he can easily compre-
hend.
Congress, by passing the Consumer Credit Protection Act,7 2
or, as popularly called, the Trut in Lending Act, 73 has taken a
71. Jordan, supra note 3, at 1293.
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positive stand with reference to consumer education.74 The Act
is not designed to regulate the terms or conditions for credit,
but rather it provides for the full disclosure of credit charges.
75
Congress did not necessarily stop with disclosure in general, but
instead, proceeded to regulate the method of disclosure by
establishing simplicity and uniformity as criteria in reporting
sales and finance costs.
7 6
The ultimate effect of sections 1638 and 1639 of the Act is to
require the seller and lender, in transactions not under open end
credit plans, to inform the consumer of the total cost and rates
"before the credit is extended." 77 To maintain uniformity, Con-
gress has required that the rates must be disclosed as an annual
percentage rate,78 as opposed to a ratio of dollars per hundred
dollars or any other noncomparable system. Section 160679 also
creates a uniform method for determining rates and allows the
Board 0 to authorize the use of rate tables and charts.s
Section 160582 further provides for a concise method for the
computation of finance charges. The section provides:
[T]he amount of the finance charge in connection with
any consumer credit transaction shall be determined as
the sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly
by the person to whom the credit is extended, and im-
posed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an inci-
dent to the extension credit, including any of the fol-
lowing types of charges which are applicable:
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount
payable under a point, discount, or other system of
additional charges.
74. Id. This section proclaims that the purpose of the Act is: (1) to
strengthen competition among various financial institutions in the field of
consumer credit; (2) to "enhance" economic stability; (3) to promote in-
formed use of credit resulting from awareness of the cost to the consumer;
(4) to assure meaningful disclosure of credit terms so the consumer can com-
pare costs readily.
75. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
76. Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1637-39 (1968).
77. Id. § 1638(b) and § 1639(b). For example, § 1638 requires that a credi-
tor, in a sales transaction, must disclose the cash price, the value of any trade-
in allowance or other credit, all other charges, individually itemized which are
not included in the finance charge, the total to be financed, the finance charge
and the finance charge expressed as an annual percentage.
78. Id. §§ 1638(a)(7), 1639(a)(5).
79. Id. § 1606.
80. Id. § 1602(b) defines the "Board" as the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
81. Id. § 1606(d).
82. rd. § 1605.
[Vol. 21
15
Applebaum: Usury Laws: Underdeveloped Protection in an Overdeveloped Market
Published by Scholar Commons, 1969
NoTns
(2) Service or carrying charge.
(3) Loan fee, finder's fee, or similar charge.
(4) Fee for an investigation or credit report.
(5) Premium or other charge for any guarantee or
insurance protecting the creditor against the obligor's
default or other credit loss.8 3
It must be remembered that while the Act does require dis-
closure and thus, hopefully, consumer education, it does not
provide for the basic protection of the consumer by rate regula-
tion; nor does it change any protection rate laws which now
exist in the states, except where it is determined that a disclosure
provision is in conflict with provisions of the Act.8" The Act
specially provides that it does not
annul, alter or affect in any manner the meaning, scope
or applicability of the laws of any State, including,
but not limited to laws, relating to the types, amounts
or rates of charges, or any element or elements of
charges, permissible under such laws in connection with
the extension or use of credit, nor does this title extend
the applicability of those laws to any class of persons
or transactions to which they would not otherwise
apply.8
5
To maintain its neutral position with respect to state law, the
Act also provides that the annual percentage rate disclosure
requirement may not be "received as evidence that the sale was
a loan or any type of transaction other than a credit sale."86
One could argue that with the advent of the federal TrutA in
Lending Act and the effective application of South Carolina
statutes to control loan rates, a seller will have to adjust his
rates so as to compete effectively with the lending institutions.
The consumer, being able to understand the charges and costs,
will do more shopping around for the best possible credit situa-
tions. While this argument in the long run may hold true for
the average seller and consumer, the need for "total" legislation
in the consumer financing field is necessary and cannot be over-
looked. As previously stated, the usury laws today can serve only
a limited purpose and many consumers will not be so educated
83. Id. § 1605(a). This section further provides that certain items need not
be included in the finance charges, as long as they are itemized and disclosed
in accordance with the regulations of the Board. Id. § 1605(d).
84. Id. § 1610(a).
85. Id. § 1610(b).
86. Id. § 1610(c).
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as to take advantage of these laws. Without comparable legisla-
tion in the sales field, the consumer is at the mercy of any
unethical seller.
It is desirable that the state act independently with respect to
its own consumer and finance situations. It appears, moreover,
that Congress itself might issue rate regulations if the states do
not act responsibly in this area. To avoid federal preemption,
the states must react to the need for credit sale legislation.
Recently, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws promulgated the Unifo'm Consumer Credit
Code87 Two of the purposes of this proposed legislation are "to
simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing retail install-
ment sales, consumer credit, small loans and usury; "88 and "to
conform the regulation of consumer credit transactions to the
policies of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act .. . ."89
The rate section of the Code provides for rather high maxi-
mum charges. As to credit sales, the Code states:
The credit service charge . . may not exceed the
equivalent of the greater of either of the following:
(a) the total of
(i) 36 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid bal-
ances of the amount financed which is $300 or less;
(ii) 21 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid
balances of the amount financed which is more than
$300 but does not exceed $1000; and
(iii) 15 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid
balances of the amount financed which is more than
$1000; or
(b) 18 per cent per year on the unpaid balances of the
amount financed. 90
At the same time the Code sets a maximum for consumer loans
of 18 per cent per year on the unpaid balances of the prin-
cipal.0 '
These high ceilings serve two very practical purposes under
discussion. They provide "rate ceilings to assure the consumer
87. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.101 (1968).
88. Id. § 1.102(2) (a). Unlike the courts application of the usury laws,
§ 1.102(1) requires this Code to be "liberally applied" so as to promote its
purposes and policies.
89. Id. § 1.102(2)(f).
90. Id. § 2.201(2). This section sets rates or services charges for consumer
sales other than revolving charge accounts. As to the limits on revolving
charge accounts see § 2.207.
91. Id. § 3.201(1).
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of an adequate supply of credit" 92 while supporting "competi-
tion among suppliers of consumer credit so that consumers may
obtain credit at reasonable cost ... ."93 By allowing a high ceil-
ing, the creditor can extend credit more freely. Ilis percentage
of loss, which may result from nonpayment by consumers and
cost of litigation, may be spread more evenly over the remaining
consumers. Also, under the credit sales provisions, the operating
cost levels of the seller may be increased because of the various
consumer protection provisions of the Code, 94 and the seller
would find it practically impossible to compete if he were
restricted by low rate ceilings.
IV. CoNcLUsION
The need for consumer protection as to rates and charges has
become apparent. Any new legislation in this field must take
into account the consumer's needs, but it must not be so restric-
tive as to stifle competition among the honest lenders and sellers.
A reasonable law will promote competition and create a market
place that is more fair and just. It is suggested, however, that
the law should provide for strong penalties against the unscrup-
ulous seller or loan shark. The low income consumer has neither
the knowledge nor, in many cases, the ability to bring court
actions to satisfy wrongs against him. The statute should be so
designed that an unscrupulous seller or lender will think twice
before committing an unlawful act. The present usury laws
cannot serve this purpose, for many lenders and sellers who act
illegally or unethically do not worry about the one-time law suit
with which they may be faced. The unscrupulous lender or
vendor realizes he can make up any such loss by applying the
same type of charges to other unknowing buyers or borrowers.
Usury laws, previously enacted, have outlived their utility in
the field of consumer protection. It is now the responsibility of
the legislature to expand the concept of consumer protection to
include the credit sales situation by providing a workable statute
for judicial enforcement.
STANLEY W. APPBAUX
92. Id. § 1.102(b).
93. Id. § 1.102(c).
94. Section 2.404, alternative A, provides for holding the assignee subject to
defenses of the buyer; § 2.502 provides for cancellation of home solicitation
sales; §§ 2.410 and 3.403 provide that there should be no assignment of the
buyer or lessee's earnings; and § 5.103 places restrictions on deficiency judg-
ments in consumer credit sales.
1969] NOTES
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1969], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss2/4
